REMARKS OF ABDULLAHI AN-NA'IM*
I want to start by saying that we have to be clear about distinguishing the forest from the trees. Culture is very fundamental, and none
of us can ever escape it, whether it is the culture that we were born
with or culture that we acquired. It is always there; it is in this room;
it is in all our minds, in all our hearts. So the issue is not to have or
not to have culture.
Religion is also fundamental and universal and is not going to go
away either. So the choice is not whether or not we can have
religion.
What is at issue, I think, is whose views of religion and culture will
prevail.
This is the notion of contestability of culture and
contestability of religion.
As a Muslim, I always make the heretical sort of statement that
religion is secular, which may appear like a contradiction in terms.
But the fact of the matter is that there is no way we can access, we can
relate to, we can be influenced and formed by religion, except
through human agency. Our human agency is definitive of our
religion. In that sense, religion is secular, religion is human-made.
The point here is to emphasize this secularity of religion, and as
such, to make it political-to make it a political asset. This concept
applies equally to culture. When I speak of religion and culture, I
speak in the same vein, in the sense that they are both human-made,
are both human-remade. In the immediate wake of America's
midterm elections, it was very interesting for me to see, as a foreigner
living in this country, how so-called American culture was manipulated, used, and abused in the campaign. What we see now in the
outcome is a triumph of a particular view of so-called American
culture.
The question for women's rights advocates and reproductive rights
advocates is not whether or not religion and culture are relevant, but
how to take control and manipulate them. In other words, the goal
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for women's rights groups is to see religion and culture as a medium
and as a vehicle of change, not necessarily as something that is
inherently antagonistic to reproductive rights and the rights of
women.
There is the mistaken impression that all we need to have is a rights
paradigm or a system of rights. The issue is not simply a question of
rights, it is a question of ability to use rights, to the extent that rights
can make any difference anyway. Beyond legal and rights paradigms,
there is a whole world of women and men and social, cultural, and
religious activities, which are deeply rooted and very inaccessible.
One of the problems that we have with negative religious and cultural
phenomena is that they are so inaccessible, and that even the victims
are co-opted into perpetuating those practices.
In my chapter seven of Rebecca Cook's book, entitled Human Rights
of Women, that theme also is touched upon, addressing how to access
those levels of consciousness and motivation, which are embodied in
religion and culture, and to transform them at that level.
Why do we give fundamentalism such space in our thinking and in
our media? The intellectuals, the liberal-minded human rights types
of the Islamic world are so apologetic and defensive; they concede to
the fundamentalists more than what the fundamentalists are asking
for themselves. Most of all, they concede to the fundamentalists the
legitimacy and the right and the ability to define the issues and to
define the space of discourse. That is something that we have to
question among ourselves. We are not simply dealing with someone
who holds a counterview, but we are dealing with our own internal
defeat, which gives that counterview more weight than it deserves.
One of the issues that one finds in discussing questions of cultural
specificity or relativism and religious fundamentalism is the fear that
by engaging in a cultural or religious discourse you are conceding the
platform, you are conceding the terms of reference to the other side.
My point is that it is not the mere faet of engaging in religious and
cultural discourse, it is the manner that we concede the discourse to
the other side. If we engage in discourse with a view that religion and
culture are all defined for us, we are being co-opted; we are conceding the struggle before engaging it.
But if we engage in that discussion with a view to redefining or to
start defining for ourselves what our religion and culture are, that
orientation is what makes a difference.
It is not simply the ability of organized religion to control our
lives-it is our inability to control our lives in the face of organized
religion.

